WITHSTAND • RESPOND • RECOVER

Grid Reliability and Resilience: Keeping the Power On

Reliability measures everyday performance. Resilience is about surviving and recovering from the rare, high-impact events. Both shape how grids are designed and operated.

01

Understanding Grid Reliability

Reliability describes the ability of the power system to deliver electricity to customers in the amount and quality they need, under normal and reasonably foreseeable conditions.

At the bulk system level, reliability is often discussed in two parts: adequacy (having enough resources to meet demand) and operating reliability or security (withstanding sudden disturbances such as the loss of a major line or generator). At the distribution level, utilities track interruption metrics, most commonly:

  • SAIFI — System Average Interruption Frequency Index: how often the average customer is interrupted.
  • SAIDI — System Average Interruption Duration Index: total interruption time for the average customer.
  • CAIDI — Customer Average Interruption Duration Index: average restoration time per interruption (SAIDI ÷ SAIFI).

Utilities and regulators may report these with and without "major event days," which isolates the effect of severe storms from everyday performance.

02

What Is Grid Resilience?

Resilience is the ability to anticipate, withstand, absorb, adapt to and rapidly recover from high-impact events — ice storms, wildfires, floods, extreme heat, geomagnetic disturbances, physical attacks or cyber incidents. These events are rare at any one location but can cause widespread, prolonged outages.

03

Reliability Versus Resilience

Two related but distinct concepts
AspectReliabilityResilience
FocusFrequent, expected disturbancesRare, high-impact events
Typical measuresSAIFI, SAIDI, CAIDI; adequacy criteriaScenario-based: outage extent, restoration time, critical load served
Planning basisHistorical performance and standardsRisk assessment, climate projections, stress testing
Example actionsMaintenance, vegetation management, automationHardening, undergrounding where justified, microgrids, mutual aid
Time horizonDaily to annual operationsEvent preparation, response and long-term adaptation
04

Electricity Outage Causes

Weather

Wind, ice, snow, lightning and heat damage equipment or bring trees into lines.

Vegetation

Tree contact is a leading cause of distribution interruptions in forested areas.

Equipment failure

Ageing or defective transformers, cables, insulators and connectors.

Third-party damage

Vehicle collisions, excavation and construction contact.

Wildlife

Animals contacting energized equipment, especially at substations.

System events

Generation shortfalls or cascading transmission events, which are rare but severe.

05

Extreme Weather Challenges

Weather is a major driver of outages. Ice accretion can collapse conductors and towers, as occurred during the 1998 ice storm in Quebec and eastern Ontario. Wildfires threaten transmission corridors in western and northern regions. Heat increases demand while reducing the capacity of lines and transformers. Flooding can damage substations. Climate projections are increasingly incorporated into planning standards and asset design.

06

Protective Equipment

Protection equipment exists to isolate faults quickly and safely: circuit breakers controlled by relays at substations; reclosers that interrupt and automatically re-energize lines to clear temporary faults (such as a branch briefly touching a line); fuses that isolate faulted branches; and surge arresters that divert lightning and switching surges. Well-coordinated protection limits each fault to the smallest possible section of the network.

07

Grid Monitoring

Control centres monitor the system through SCADA, synchrophasor data, meter outage notifications, weather feeds and, increasingly, equipment condition sensors. Better visibility allows operators to anticipate problems, respond during events and restore service with more accurate information. See Smart Grid Technology for the sensing and communications layers.

08

Automated Fault Detection

Automated fault location uses data from relays, fault indicators and meters to estimate where a fault occurred, narrowing the area crews must patrol. Combined with remotely operated switches, FLISR schemes can restore service to unaffected sections automatically. These schemes reduce the number of customers affected and the duration for many, but they cannot restore customers on the damaged section until repairs are made.

09

Distribution Network Restoration

  1. Step 1

    Make safe

    Isolate hazards such as downed lines; public safety comes first.

  2. Step 2

    Assess damage

    Use system data, patrols and customer reports to scope the event.

  3. Step 3

    Restore critical infrastructure

    Prioritize transmission, substations and essential services such as hospitals.

  4. Step 4

    Restore largest groups first

    Repair main feeders that return power to the most customers.

  5. Step 5

    Individual services

    Address remaining smaller branches and individual connections.

During large events, utilities may also draw on mutual assistance — crews and equipment from other utilities, sometimes across provincial or national borders.

10

Microgrids and Local Resilience

A microgrid is a group of interconnected loads and energy resources within defined electrical boundaries that can operate connected to the grid or, in many designs, disconnect and run independently ("islanding"). Microgrids can keep critical facilities — hospitals, emergency centres, campuses — operating during wider outages. In Canada, many remote communities already operate as isolated grids, often with diesel generation, and some have incorporated renewables and storage.

Microgrids add cost and complexity, including protection and control requirements, and are typically justified where the value of local resilience is high.

11

Cybersecurity Considerations

Resilience planning increasingly includes cyber events. Utilities prepare through layered defences, monitoring, incident response exercises, backup control capabilities and the ability to operate key systems manually if digital systems are compromised. Bulk power system entities in North America are subject to NERC CIP standards as adopted in each jurisdiction.

12

Planning and Risk Reduction

Hardening

Stronger poles and structures, covered conductors, flood protection for substations.

Vegetation management

Risk-based trimming and removal along corridors.

Selective undergrounding

Reduces weather exposure but costs more and complicates repairs; used selectively.

Redundancy

Alternate supply paths, spare transformers and backup control centres.

Distributed resources

Storage and microgrids supporting critical loads.

Preparedness

Emergency plans, drills, mutual aid agreements and public communication.

13

Canadian Climate and Regional Context

Canada's size and climate create distinct regional risks: ice storms in central and eastern Canada, wildfire in British Columbia, the Prairies and the North, hurricanes and post-tropical storms in Atlantic Canada, and extreme cold that drives winter peaks across much of the country. Northern and remote communities face long supply chains and limited redundancy.

Reliability standards for the bulk system are coordinated with NERC and regional entities, while distribution reliability is overseen provincially. No technology eliminates outages; the goal is to reduce their frequency, extent and duration at reasonable cost. Next, learn how smart meters help detect outages and measure consumption.

Next: Smart Metering Technology

See how interval meters and AMI networks contribute to outage detection and customer information.